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I. INTRODUCTION
To charge up my batteries before writing Software Patents for John
Wiley & Sons, I attended four days of hearings on software patents, of-
ficiated by Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. The hearings were split equally between West coast
and East, two days in San Jose, California and two days in Washington,
D.C. It should come as no surprise that the attendees in San Jose and
Washington, D.C. were as diverse as was the weather in those two cities
that winter of 1993/94.
The San Jose crowd was a mixture of big business, small business,
and what appeared to be folk heroes of the cyberpunk movement. I infer
the folk hero status of the latter by the pockets of rowdy cheers and ap-
plause that would erupt sporadically from the audience as these persons
testified. Big business did little cheering. Also present in San Jose was
the computer trade press. The reporters seemed to appear, en mass, just
in time to hear testimony of their favorite folk heroes and then disap-
peared. Perhaps the reporters retired to a nearby watering hole to work
on their notes in the true spirit of Hunter S. Thompson. In any event, I
find it interesting that the just-in-time technique of the automotive
manufacturing industry has spread to the trade press industry.
The Washington crowd was a mixture of big business (mostly East
coast and international companies), small business, and, of course,
Washington, D.C. law firms. If the trade press was present, it was far
less obvious. The crowd was considerably more subdued in Washing-
ton. The weather may have had a lot to do with it. Much of
Washington was closed due to a freezing rain storm, and the audience
t Originally submitted as a position paper for an online panel discussion.
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seemed to comprise mostly persons waiting to testify or waiting to
catch the next flight home.
What drew all of these people to testify to Patent Commissioner
Lehman? It seems that something being termed the "software patent" is
about to explode in the face of the fastest growing industry in Amer-
ica-the software industry. The sides are drawn: one side urging the
Commissioner to abolish software patents; the other side deeply fearful
that he just might do it. Each side argues forcefully-equities, econom-
ics, technology, tradition-and yet, neither side seems to comprehend
that the issue they debate is a reincarnation of an issue that has been
debated for the last eight hundred years. Queen Elizabeth first debated it
when the Crown's right to grant a patent on playing cards was tried in
1602; Thomas Jefferson and James Madison debated it when the Bill of
Rights was drafted in 1788; and we debate it now.
The question is this: where do we draw the line between private
ownership and the public domain? It is not a question of choosing be-
tween copyright and patent, of choosing between hardware and
software, or of choosing between implementation and algorithm. It is a
more fundamental question that reaches back to ancient human values
and transcends our current fixation on computers and software.
It helps to put things in perspective. When debating where we and
the law are headed (as we are now), it helps to know where we have
been. In this regard, do not assume that software patents are new-
trodden soil. In fact, software patents have been around longer than you
might think. What was the first software patent? The answer may sur-
prise you.
II. IN SEARCH OF THE FIRST SOFTWARE PATENT
Those who learn about law from the computer trade press treat the
software patent as a new disease-as a rash of sorts that must be
stopped quickly before it spreads. Perhaps the computer trade press is
just writing what its readers want to hear, but they have it all wrong.
The software patent is not new. While it is noble to curb a rash of bad
decisions, it is lunacy to amputate an arm of law that has served us well
for centuries.
Perhaps finding the first software patent will help. Nothing quiets
the new disease argument quite as well as giving examples of healthy
software patents that flourished long before the recent software patent
controversy arose.
Before we can begin identifying the first software patent, we should
agree on what software is. That may not be easy. Software is like life.
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We can all agree when we see it, but we may not agree on what makes it
so. Here are some possible definitions to work with:
(1) coded instructions that cause a machine to operate in a cer-
tain way;
(2) that which adapts a general purpose computer to special
purpose;
(3) a computer-implemented method of performing any task.
So what is the very first software patent? Here are two candidates:
(1) 3,633,176-Kaiser Aluminum's January 4, 1972 patent for
its "Recursive Kopy Program for Remote Input Management
System";
(2) 2,552,629-Bell Labs' May 15, 1951 patent for its "Error-
Detecting and Correcting System"
The Bell Labs' patent certainly qualifies as early. It was applied for
only four years after Bell Labs had finished building its first computer,
the General Purpose Relay Calculator. However, there is another soft-
ware patent candidate that predates the Bell Labs' patent by one
hundred years. The patent belongs to Samuel Morse.
You are no doubt familiar with Samuel Morse-the man who was
awarded a series of patents in the 1840's for his invention of the tele-
graph. Did you know that Morse was awarded (and the Supreme Court
upheld) a claim to his Morse code? Here is that claim:
I claim, as my invention, the system of signs, consisting of dots and
spaces, and of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters,
words or sentences, substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for
telegraphic purposes.
Could this be the first software patent? Morse code certainly quali-
fies as "coded instructions that cause a machine to operate in a certain
way." Today's digital computers use coded instructions (machine code)
based on a binary system (I's and O's). Morse's "machine code" is
based on a ternary system (dots, dashes, and spaces). Other than that,
there is no real difference.
Before you deny Morse the title of first software patentee (or urge
that Morse code is not software because it is only for the telegraphic
purpose of transporting information), consider this. A digital computer
equipped with modem and a communications program also transports
1. O'Reifly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 86 (1853).
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information for telegraphic purposes using its binary system of signs
(l's and O's). The computer's communication program is software. Is
the message?
III. INFORMATION WANTS TO BE FREE
Another notion that often crops up in debates over software patents
is that there is something inherently unique about software and that we
are blazing a new trail in legally defining it. Perhaps it is that software is
as close as we have come to extending the human brain beyond our
bodies. In one sense, software is the transference of knowledge from the
human brain to the computer brain, from the neural net to the Internet.
Software is a vision sculpted in silicon; it is a master plan written down
in Fortran; it is order squeezed from chaos and bottled up in a CD-
ROM.
Software is information-information is software. And software
wants to be free. "Software wants to be free" is the credo of the cyber-
punk movement that traces is roots to William Gibson's science fiction
novel Neuromancer.2 Neuromancer is about a futuristic world ruled by
multinational corporations in which cyberspace cowboys directly wire
their brains through computer terminal to the Net in order to hack their
way through layers of encryption "ice" to gain access to the information
they seek.
Some opponents of software patents take the cyberpunk credo to
heart and argue that software, or at least the underlying ideas embodied
in the software, should not be subject to private ownership. Software, or
at least the underlying ideas embodied in the software, should be free.
The cyberpunks are in good company, at least insofar as ownership
of ideas is concerned. Thomas Jefferson, it turns out, was a cyberpunk.
Jefferson believed that ideas are and should be free. Here is how Jeffer-
son put it:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power
called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as
long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it
forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver
cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is
that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the
whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
2. WILLAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
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instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas
would freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently
designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible
over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and
like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.3
Do not be mistaken to assume that Jefferson was in any way
"antipatent." Jefferson formulated our nation's first patent laws. (Many
of Jefferson's concepts are still used today.) Jefferson also served as the
first Commissioner of the Patent Office (the position Bruce Lehman
holds today), and Jefferson personally reviewed and examined each and
every patent that issued through his Patent Office.
The patent law, as Jefferson devised it and as it exists today,
draws a line between abstract ideas and patentable inventions.
Ideas (ranging from lofty theories about gravity to the punch line
of a joke) are not patentable as they are not something that anyone
can own. Gravity and the ability to laugh are gifts of nature; they
are simply not property that one can own to the exclusion of eve-
ryone else.
Inventions are different. Inventions are artificial, human-created
things. We humans control our inventions, making them and unmaking
them as we see fit. Inventions are patentable if they are novel and not
obvious. It has been very difficult for the legal system to articulate the
difference between ideas (which Jefferson says should remain free) and
inventions (from which society benefits through grant of a patent).
The difficulty in articulating the difference between idea and inven-
tion is not unique to software. The U.S. Supreme Court has been
grappling with this issue since 1852 (and the English courts before that).
The issue is what is patentable subject matter-a separating of raw ideas
which are incapable of being patented from the creations of humanity
which (if new) are capable of being patented. Here is the Supreme
Court's record on this issue-see if you can find a common thread:
(1) method of making pipe that capitalizes on lead's melting
property-held not patentable subject matter;4
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPhereson (Aug. 13, 1813).
4. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
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(2) method of using electromagnetism, however developed, for
remotely printing intelligible characters-held not patentable
subject matter;5
(3) the rubber tipped pencil eraser-held not patentable subject
matter;
(4) method of making flour-held was patentable subject matter;
7
(5) mechanical process of making metal lath by cutting slits in
sheet metal and expanding it-held was patentable subject
matter;8
(6) a V-shaped radio antenna angled according to a mathemati-
cal formula-held was patentable subject matter;9
(7) improving the nitrogen fixing ability of leguminous plants
by mixing certain naturally occurring strains of different species
of root-nodule bacteria and inoculating the plants with the mix-
ture-held not patentable subject matter;0
(8) method of converting binary coded decimal (BCD) numbers
into pure binary numbers-held not patentable subject matter;"
(9) method of updating the value of an alarm limit used in the
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons-held not pat-
entable subject matter;12
(10) a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing at
least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each providing
separate hydrocarbon degradative pathways (the bacteria eats
oil spills)-held was patentable subject matter; 3
5. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
6. Rubber-Tip Pencil v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874).
7. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
8. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
9. MacKay Radio & Tel. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
10. Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
11. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
12. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
13. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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(11) method of operating a rubber mold in which a digital com-
puter determines when to open the mold-held was patentable
subject matter."
Is there a common thread that binds the Court's reasoning? If there
is (and I believe there is), it certainly is not immediately apparent. If you
will indulge me in a little side trip, I'll show you how I unravel the
thread.
IV. THE COMMON THREAD TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
You've followed every twist and turn; explored every promising
way out, every dead end. Now, just as you think you have conquered the
labyrinth, you find yourself standing smack dab in front of a thirty-foot
slab of granite that is blocking your way. That's how a software attorney
feels each time a new decision is rendered on what is patentable soft-
ware subject matter. It's little comfort, but the justices probably feel the
same way as you.
To be sure, it is an important question. What discoveries should so-
ciety reward with a patent property right. If answered correctly, society
benefits and inventing proliferates. If answered incorrectly, progress
pays the ransom. Fortunately, as with many important questions, society
has grappled with this property right question before.
If you have had the pleasure of attending law school, perhaps you
remember Pierson v. Post5 from first year law school. If not, don't feel
bad. It was property law 101. Here is a refresher. Post was held not to
own the fox he was chasing across public land; hence Post could not
recover against Pierson-a man who leaped from a bushy hiding place
and shot the fox first with Post still in hot pursuit. 6 Possession is nine-
tenths of the law, and Post did not own the wild fox he was pursuing.
The Supreme Court has rendered three software patent decisions in
a long line of decisions on what is patentable subject matter. More re-
cently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (that hears all patent
appeals) has rendered four significant software patent decisions in the
last year: In re Alappat;7 In re Warmerdam;8 In re Lowry;'9 and In re
14. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
15. 3 Cal. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
16. Id.
17. 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
18. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
19. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36805 (1994).
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Trovato.2 Many see these cases as irreconcilable. Perhaps there is a
common thread in Pierson v. Post.
Since early times, the patent has been an inducement to exchange
technical know-how for a property right. Share your new and useful dis-
covery with the public, and the patent is yours-that's the deal. If you
don't own the discovery you offer, then the deal is off. Pierson v. Post
teaches us that ownership requires human control. If you do not control
the fox, you cannot claim to own it. The public does not grant patents
for untamed laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena.
What does it mean to be in control? That can be a difficult question.
Often proving the absence of control is easier. Take Isaac Newton for
example. Newton discovered that apples fall from trees according to
precise rules. Newton even devised a branch of mathematics (calculus)
to describe these rules. Can Newton claim to own gravity? Well ask
yourself, "Does Newton control gravity?" Certainly not. The proof:
Newton cannot prevent apples from falling from trees. Newton's dis-
covery, while brilliant, lacks the element of human control. Newton
does not own gravity. Gravity remains a wild fox.
V. THE THREAD UNRAVELED
If you're with me so far and want a few examples, read on. I believe
you can find the presence or absence of human control at the core of
every patentable subject matter question. A few examples from the
more recent Federal Circuit decisions in In re Alappat,2' In re Warmer-
dam," In re Lowry,2 and In re Trovato24 help make this point. Let us
start with In re Alappat.2 Alappat discovered a rasterizer for making a
diagonal line of a digital oscilloscope trace look less like a stair step by
partially dimming the pixels that fall on the stair step corners. Human
control is present because one can make the rasterizer exist or cease to
exist by assembling or disassembling the claimed component parts. The
claimed combination is patentable subject matter.
In re Trovato26 is the other side of the coin. Trovato discovered that
the least costly route from point A to point B can be modeled by as-
signing a cost to each leg of every route and by then trying all possible
20. 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
21. 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
23. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36805 (1994).
24. 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
25. 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
26. 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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combinations. However, Trovato's least-cost relationship is true-by
definition. The least costly route is always the sum of the least costly
segments. One is powerless to change this relationship; hence human
control is absent, and the claimed relationship is not patentable subject
matter.
In re Warmerdam27 and In re Lowry28 provide another two-sided
coin to examine. Interestingly, both cases involve claims to a computer
data structure. Warmerdam claims a data structure for representing a
physical object, and Lowry claims a general purpose data structure not
tied to any specific physical object. The relation object renders one pat-
entable and the other not but not in the way you might first think.
Warmerdam discovered that abstract "bubbles" lined up along the
medial axis of an object (like a snowman along a stick figure) can
model the space occupied by the object. 9 Warmerdam's discovery
amounts to an abstract observation-true of all physical objects-that a
physical object always fits within a series of boundaries lined up along
the object's medial axis. One cannot make this relationship cease to ex-
ist, hence human control is absent. Warmerdam's data structure is not
patentable subject matter.
Lowry devised a general purpose computer data structure to hold
and organize information into different categories, like different com-
partments of digital suitcase." Lowry selected his compartments from
an infinite universe of possible data compartments. Human control is
present because of this human selection. Lowry's data structure is pat-
entable subject matter.
The next time you face a patentable subject matter issue, give the
human control test a try. First, identify what the applicant claims to
have invented or discovered, and, then, see if you can find the element
of human control. If you find human control and weave it into the
claims, you should have no trouble with the patentable subject matter
issue. If you cannot find human control, you are probably chasing a wild
fox.
VI. So WHAT Is THE PATENT OFFICE DOING Now THAT THE COURTS
HAVE RULED SOFTWARE Is PATENTABLE?
In response to the recent Federal Circuit decisions, the Patent Office
promulgated new Guidelines that the patent examiners use in evaluating
27. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
28. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36805 (1994).
29. Warmnerdam, 33 F.3d at 1357.
30. Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1580.
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software patent inventions." Technically, the Guidelines are not law, but
rather they are the Patent Office's interpretation of the law. Neverthe-
less, the Guidelines are quite important because they dictate what the
software patent applicant must do to satisfy the Patent Office.
So what's new? For one thing, the Patent Office has dropped its
fixation on the prohibition against all mathematical algorithms. Instead,
the Patent Office now offers several suggestions on how certain com-
puter-related subject matter may be presumed statutory. You will
undoubtedly find that many software inventions fall into one of these
three categories:
(1) computer or programmable apparatus (a statutory
"machine");32
(2) computer-readable memory for directing a computer to
function in a particular manner (a statutory "article of manu-
facture");
3
(3) computer-implemented or computer-aided process (a statu-
tory "process").'
Take a good look at the second category. To claim the algorithm,
you have to claim the memory. To claim the genie, you have to claim
the bottle. That appears to be what the Patent Office is saying.
Does that mean that any genie you can put into memory is statutory
subject matter? No. Prerecorded music stored in CD-ROM memory,
whether the earliest Beethoven or the latest Body Bags, is one genie that
is not patentable subject matter. We all know this instinctively. The
challenge is to explain why-something which the Guidelines do not
do. Thus, for the time being, a technological genie on a disk is patent-
able; music, literature, and art on a disk is not.
Maybe this will not present a problem for most of us, but if the Jef-
ferson Airplane will sue a screen saver manufacturer over flying
toasters,35 someone out there is bound to force the Federal Circuit to an-
swer this thorny software patent question: what is art?
31. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478
(1996).
32. Id. at 7482.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 7483.
35. See Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, 886 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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VII. WHAT IS IN STORE FOR THE FUTURE?
In the future, we may have to adjust the cyberpunk's credo:
"Information wants to be free, but the information packaging and deliv-
ery system is going to cost you!" I envision a layered intellectual
property protection model, something like the ISO/OSI layered model
used to describe software. Both patent and copyright protection will
factor into the layered model.
If you are not familiar with the ISO/OSI layered model, here is a
brief introduction. ISO/OSI stands for International Organization for
Standardization/Open Systems Interconnection. It is a layered architec-
tural model or plan for how computers communicate with each other
over a communications network. The model can also be applied to soft-
ware itself. The plan divides software communication into seven layers,
each layer building on the layer below it, with the most primitive func-
tions handled at the lowest layer (called the physical layer) and with the
most advanced functions handled at the highest layer (called the appli-
cation layer). By analogy to a human-to-human telephone conversation,
the physical layer concerns whether the phone is plugged in properly,
and the application layer concerns whether both parties understand the
semantic meaning of the words they are speaking.
If you think about it, much software developed today is a form of
information packaging and delivery. Certainly, World Wide Web
browsers and interactive television software fall into this category. So
does the lowly spreadsheet program that packages the data you enter
and supplies it back to you in a tabular or graphical form that is easier to
understand. It's all information packaging.
Viewed as an information packaging and delivery system, software
fits a layered ISO/OSI model quite well. At least the layered model al-
lows us to separate the information or content from the software
systems employed to package and deliver this content. Take a software
system for delivering prerecorded music over the Internet in an interac-
tive, user-controllable form. To the teenage end user the product is
music-all that matters is the content. To the software engineer, the
product may be a new form of Java applet that allows music to be com-
pressed, delivered, and decompressed faster than it would take to listen
to the song when played-all that matters is the compression technol-
ogy; the content is irrelevant. To the communication engineer, the
product may be a new form of software controlled fiber optic switching
system that allows any piece of music to be delivered to the teenager on
demand-again the software switching technology is all that matters;
the content of the information and how it is compressed is irrelevant.
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As you can see, the software-enabled technology, which is on the
horizon, involves many different layers of abstraction. Different blends
of intellectual property protection may be required. For the highest level
of abstraction (the information content itself), I believe the copyright
will continue to be the most suitable form of protection. For the lowest
level of abstraction (the physical packaging and delivery details), I be-
lieve the patent will continue to be the most suitable form of protection.
In the middle is where it gets interesting.
